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JUDICIAL CONFIRMATION WARS: IDEOLOGY AND THE
BATTLE FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS *
Sheldon Goldman **
Over the past two decades, there have been highly contentious
battles over the confirmation of federal court judges, battles that
have been increasing in intensity and number-virtual judicial
confirmation wars.' In this Article, I explore why this has come
about, focusing on the role of ideology in judicial selection as well
as the empirical reality of the confirmation process as it has
evolved over the more than a quarter century since Jimmy Carter
was elected president. I also explore ways to end these so-called
confirmation wars while offering an alternative take on these
phenomena.
I. WHY THE Focus ON IDEOLOGY?
Ordinarily, with the exception of the nomination of U.S. Su-
preme Court Justices, the nomination and confirmation of federal
judges is not a subject of extensive media attention and conse-
quently not on the minds of most Americans. During recent
* This Article in part draws from, revises, and updates portions of my earlier works:
SHELDON GOLDMAN, PICKING FEDERAL JUDGES: LOWER COURT SELECTION FROM
ROOSEVELT THROUGH REAGAN (1997); and Sheldon Goldman, Assessing the Senate Judi-
cial Confirmation Process: The Index of Obstruction and Delay, 86 JUDICATURE 251 (2003).
Some of the material in this Article was used in a public lecture I delivered at the Univer-
sity of Massachusetts on October 20, 2004. I would like to thank Department Chair M.J.
Peterson, Dean Janet Rifkin, Provost Charlena Seymour, and Chancellor John Lombardi
for their support. I am also grateful to Dean Rodney A. Smolla and Professor Carl W. To-
bias for the opportunity to participate in the Allen Chair Symposium at the University of
Richmond School of Law on April 16, 2004. Finally, I am indebted to Sean Roche and his
fellow editors for their work on my article.
** Professor of Political Science, University of Massachusetts at Amherst. B.A., 1961,
New York University; M.A., 1964, Harvard University; Ph.D., 1965, Harvard University.
1. See, e.g., Michael J. Gerhardt, Judicial Selection as War, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
667 (2003); Sheldon Goldman, Unpicking Pickering in 2002: Some Thoughts on the Politics
of Lower Federal Court Selection and Confirmation, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 695 (2003);
Ellen Goodman, The War over the Judiciary, BOSTON GLOBE, May 15, 2003, at A15.
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presidential election campaigns including the most recent one in
2004, the opposing sides have raised the issue of the appointment
of federal judges.2 The major party platforms adopted by each
party's national convention mention judicial selection, and it is
clear that the party division over judicial selection is profound.
The 2004 Democratic Party platform is succinct in what it has to
say about the selection of judges: "We support the appointment of
judges who will uphold our laws and constitutional rights, not
their own narrow agendas."3
The 2004 Republican Party platform is more expansive in what
it has to say about judges and judicial selection.4 In a special sec-
tion of the ninety-two-page platform, titled "Supporting Judges
Who Uphold the Law," the platform states in part:
In the federal courts, scores of judges with activist backgrounds in
the hard-left now have lifetime tenure. Recent events have made it
clear that these judges threaten America's dearest institutions and
our very way of life. In some states, activist judges are redefining the
institution of marriage. The Pledge of Allegiance has already been
invalidated by the courts once, and the Supreme Court's ruling has
left the Pledge in danger of being struck down again-not because
the American people have rejected it and the values that it embodies,
but because a handful of activist judges threaten to overturn com-
monsense and tradition. And while the vast majority of Americans
support a ban on partial birth abortion, this brutal and violent prac-
2. See Neil A. Lewis, Bush, in Edward's State, Declares His Confidence in Carrying it
Once More, N.Y. TIMES, July 8, 2004, at A14 (detailing President Bush's comments on the
campaign trail accusing his presidential rival of wanting "activist judges who will rewrite
the law from the bench," and the rejoinder from the Kerry campaign taking the President
to task for "playing politics in stumping for judicial nominees who would roll back the
freedoms that make America great"). Senator Kerry was already on record as stating: "I
am prepared to filibuster, if necessary, any Supreme Court nominee who would turn back
the clock on a woman's right to choose or the Constitutional right to privacy, on civil rights
and individual liberties, and on the laws protecting workers and the environment." Adam
Nagourney, Senator Ready to Filibuster over Views of Court Pick, N.Y. TIMES, June 21,
2003, at A13.
3. DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL COMMITTEE, 2004 DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL PLATFORM
COMMITTEE REPORT, STRONG AT HOME, RESPECTED IN THE WORLD: THE DEMOCRATIC
PLATFORM FOR AMERICA 35 (2004), http://www.dems2004.org/atf/cfl(59B09D55-4544-D5F-
965C-8DBD20B51054}/Platform%202004%20-%20by%2OComm%20(2).pdf (last visited
Jan. 22, 2005). This is the only explicit mention of the appointment of judges in the entire
forty-one page platform document.
4. The Republican Party platform specifically addresses activist judges. See
REPUBLICAN NATIONAL PLATFORM COMMITTEE REPORT, 2004 REPUBLICAN PARTY
PLATFORM: A SAFER WORLD AND A MORE HOPEFUL AMERICA 76-77 (2004), http://www.
gop.com/media/2004platform.pdf (last visited Jan. 22, 2005).
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tice will likely continue by judicial fiat.... President Bush has es-
tablished a solid record of nominating only judges who have demon-
strated respect for the Constitution and the democratic processes of
our republic, and Republicans in the Senate have strongly supported
those nominees. We call upon obstructionist Democrats in the Senate
to abandon their unprecedented and highly irresponsible filibuster of
President Bush's highly qualified judicial nominees, and to allow the
Republican Party to restore respect for the law to America's courts.
5
In another section of the platform there is a clear statement of
the use of ideological litmus tests for the appointment of judges:
"We support the appointment of judges who respect traditional
family values and the sanctity of innocent human life."6
The core constituencies of both parties, as well as scholars of
law and courts, understand that judging is an art and not a sci-
ence. It is a process of applying the provisions of statutes or con-
stitutions-which may be vaguely worded-to a specific set of
facts. The judge must figure out for herself what the words of the
Constitution, the statute, or the precedent mean as applied to the
case at hand. The study of the use of discretion by judges and how
that judicial discretion impacts the claims of the parties is the
study of judicial behavior, a major facet of the public law subfield
within the Political Science discipline.
Studies of judicial behavior have identified judges who are ju-
dicially liberal in their willingness to give a generous interpreta-
tion to those asserting their civil rights, political liberties, or due
process rights.' Other judges have been identified as judicially
conservative in their willingness to support government's claims
that regulation of rights and liberties is in the greater public in-
terest.' And there are judicial moderates who by definition fall
somewhere in between the judicially liberal and the judicially
conservative .'
There are abundant examples of federal judges exercising their
5. Id.
6. Id. at 84.
7. JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED 329-31, 422-24 (2002).
8. Id. at 422-24 (analyzing the Rehnquist Court's support of state and federal action
restricting civil liberties).
9. Id.
2005]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
discretion in liberal or conservative directions. ° The Supreme
Court is widely understood by those who follow the Court to be
split between the three hardcore conservatives consisting of Chief
Justice William Rehnquist, Justices Antonin Scalia and Clarence
Thomas, and four Justices on the left wing of the Court consisting
of Justices John Paul Stevens, David Souter, Ruth Bader Gins-
burg, and Stephen Breyer.1 Occupying the right of center middle-
ground are Justices Sandra Day O'Connor and Anthony Ken-
nedy. 2 Judicial liberals, moderates, and conservatives populate
the lower federal courts as well.13
Federal judges can and do rule on almost every facet of life in
the United States. Indeed, it matters who sits on the Supreme
Court of the United States and on the lower federal courts. And
Justices and judges are not fungible, something very well under-
stood by advocacy groups on the right and left who have mobi-
lized their forces and resources in the judicial confirmation wars
seeking to influence presidents and senators. 4
II. IDEOLOGICAL POLARIZATION AMONG PARTY ELITES, ADVOCACY
GROUPS, AND THE BORK AND THOMAS NOMINATIONS
A phenomenon in American politics that helps explain why the
confirmation wars have come about is the ideological divide be-
10. Id. at 115-77 (describing the political history of the Supreme Court of the United
States).
11. Id. at 1; see also Bob Egelko, Election at the Crossroads; Supreme Court: Aging
Judiciary Heralds Historic Transformation, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 18, 2004, at Al.
12. SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 7, at 1; see also Egelko, supra note 11, at Al; Linda
Greenhouse, The Year Rehnquist May Have Lost His Court, N.Y. TIMES, July 5, 2004, at
A2 (describing the different positions Justices have taken on key issues during the
Rehnquist Court).
13. See, e.g., C.K. ROWLAND & ROBERT A. CARP, POLITICS AND JUDGMENT IN FEDERAL
DISTRICT COURTS 24-57 (1996); Robert A. Carp, Kenneth L. Manning & Ronald Stidham,
The Decision-Making Behavior of George W. Bush's Judicial Appointees: Far-Right, Con-
servative, or Moderate?, 88 JUDICATURE 20, 25-27 (2004); Susan B. Haire, Martha Ann
Humphries & Donald R. Songer, The Voting Behavior of Clinton's Courts of Appeals Ap-
pointees, 84 JUDICATURE 274, 278-81 (2001).
14. See LAURA COHEN BELL, WARRING FACTIONS: INTEREST GROUPS, MONEY, AND THE
NEW POLITICS OF SENATE CONFIRMATION 70-85, 147-57 (2002); see also NANCY SCHERER,
SCORING POINTS: POLITICIANS, ACTIVISTS AND THE LOWER FEDERAL COURT APPOINTMENT
PROCESS (forthcoming 2005) [hereinafter SCHERER, SCORING POINTS]; Nancy Scherer, The
Judicial Confirmation Process: Mobilizing Elites, Mobilizing Masses, 86 JUDICATURE 240,
240-50 (2003) (describing how special interest groups exploit their mobilization power to
influence the judicial confirmation process).
[Vol. 39:871
JUDICIAL CONFIRMATION WARS
tween Democratic and Republican party activists. Politics among
political elites has become more ideologically polarized while at
the same time the large majority of Americans are more moderate
or indifferent to politics. This has come about over the past forty
years as the old patronage-based political party machines have
atrophied to be replaced by issue-oriented party organizations
taken over or fueled by policy-oriented activists.15 The issues of
the 1960s and 1970s-civil rights of African-Americans and other
ethnic minorities, the rights of women, the Vietnam War, and the
Watergate scandals and abuse of governmental power-all stimu-
lated the move toward issue-oriented party organizations. 6 So
did abortion, affirmative action, crime, the heavy hand of gov-
ernment, and like issues that formed the basis of Ronald
Reagan's political revolution. 17
Where once patronage jobs were the incentives for people to
work for the party organizations and their candidates, now policy
positions provided the new incentives.' 8 At the same time numer-
ous advocacy non-profit groups formed to promote their individ-
ual agendas which ultimately included the appointment of sym-
pathetic judges to the federal bench.' 9 These groups could give or
withhold their political support to politicians, which meant that
they could mobilize their membership with a well conceived mail-
ing or telephone campaign. At the same time, these groups devel-
oped their own paid bureaucracy which required that there be a
continuing if not growing base of paid memberships in the or-
ganization as well as ongoing fundraising. Emphasizing the or-
ganization's issues and dramatizing the conflicts with opposing
groups became a way for the groups to keep their core supporters
committed to their organizations and to recruit new members.
Contributing to the polarization of party elites has been the
role of the media in dramatizing the issues and the differences
between the groups in their sustaining effort to gain readers or
15. See MORRIS P. FIORINA ET AL., CULTURE WAR? THE MYTH OF A POLARIZED AMERICA
33-50 (2005); see also SCHERER, SCORING POINTS, supra note 14.
16. L.A. Powe, Jr., The Not-So-Brave New Constitutional Order, 117 HARV. L. REV.
647, 656-63 (2003) (reviewing MARK TUSHNET, THE NEW CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER (2003)).
17. Id. at 664-66.
18. For the first book-length study of what was then an emerging phenomenon, see
JAMES Q. WILSON, THE AMATEUR DEMOCRAT: CLUB POLITICS IN THREE CITIES 200-25,
348-49 (1962).
19. See BELL, supra note 14, at 68-72.
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viewers so that the various media outlets can attract advertising
income. Interestingly, there is evidence that the conflicts between
the elites do not mirror the reality of the mass public.2"
Advocacy or interest groups have assumed a place of promi-
nence in the selection and particularly the confirmation proc-
esses.21 There were occasional instances before the 1980s when
these groups became involved in a judicial nomination, but those
were relatively small-scale compared to the battle over federal
appellate court judge Robert Bork, nominated by President
Ronald, Reagan to the Supreme Court of the United States in
1987.22
The Bork nomination mobilized the advocacy groups opposed to
the nomination, and they poured an unprecedented amount of re-
sources into media ads attacking Judge Bork.2' These groups also
actively lobbied senators. Robert Bork himself was a distin-
guished conservative legal scholar who had an impressive profes-
sional background-Yale Law School professor, Solicitor General
of the United States, a partner in a major District of Columbia
law firm-and in the several years prior to his Supreme Court
nomination he was serving as a judge on the United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, a post to which he
had been easily confirmed by the United States Senate.24 But
when he was nominated to the Supreme Court, his legal writings
challenging the constitutional basis for Roe v. Wade,25 the land-
mark 1973 decision that established the right of a woman to abort
a non-viable fetus, formed one of the bases for opposing his nomi-
nation.26 At his confirmation hearing, Judge Bork promised to
keep an open mind on the issue of abortion and the right to pri-
vacy.27 Liberal and moderate Democratic and Republican senators
20. See FIORINAETAL., supra note 15, at 51-111.
21. See BELL, supra note 14, at 149-57.
22. ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE
LAW 275-321 (1990); see also HENRY J. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES, PRESIDENTS, AND SENATORS:
A HISTORY OF THE U.S. SUPREME COURT APPOINTMENTS FROM WASHINGTON TO CLINTON
297-99 (rev. ed. 1999).
23. BORK, supra note 22, at 282-93.
24. COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, UNITED STATES SENATE: NOMINATION OF ROBERT
H. BORK TO BE AN ASSOCIATE JUSTICE OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 3 (1987).
25. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
26. See BORE, supra note 22, at 281.
27. See COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, supra note 24, at 34.
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did not believe him, and they were right not to. 28 Bork, after he
resigned from the federal bench, admitted that he believed Roe v.
Wade was wrongly decided and all but explicitly said that had he
been on the Supreme Court he would have provided the fifth vote
to overturn Roe v. Wade.29 Were Bork on the Court instead of An-
thony Kennedy, who filled the slot originally slated for Bork, Roe
v. Wade-a woman's constitutional right of privacy to terminate a
non-viable fetus from an unwanted pregnancy-would be history.
After Bork, conservative activist groups joined their liberal
counterparts in vetting judicial nominees and mounting pressure
at the executive branch level as well as the senatorial level, pro-
moting the candidacies of ideological soul-mates and opposing
nominees or potential nominees they found particularly objec-
tionable. The confirmation wars were on!
When George H.W. Bush was elected president and took office
in 1989, the Democrats controlled the Senate.3 ° Interestingly, the
confirmation wars cooled down, perhaps because the American
people had spoken decisively at the ballot box and perhaps be-
cause the nominees were not seen by the Democrats as beyond
the pale.31 When Bush had his first Supreme Court position to fill
in 1990, he named a non-controversial moderate conservative-
David Souter-who subsequently went onto the Court and even-
tually became one of the more liberal members of the Court.32
Then in 1991, President Bush went full force in trying to shift the
federal courts ideologically to the right along the lines of his
predecessor in office, Ronald Reagan.33 This was signaled not only
by highly conservative nominees to the courts of appeals and dis-
trict courts, but also by the nomination of Clarence Thomas to re-
place Thurgood Marshall, the legendary hero of the civil rights
movement, who retired from the Court in 1991. 34
28. See ROBERT H. BORK, COERCING VIRTUE: THE WORLDWIDE RULES OF JUDGES 71
(2003).
29.. See id.
30. Sheldon Goldman, The Bush Imprint on the Judiciary: Carrying on a Tradition,
74 JUDICATURE 294, 295 (1991).
31. BELL, supra note 14, at 57.
32. See BERNARD SCHWARTZ, A HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT 368 (1993); SEGAL &
SPAETH, supra note 7, at 416.
33. See Sheldon Goldman, Bush's Judicial Legacy: The Final Imprint, 76 JUDICATURE
282, 296-97 (1993).
34. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 32, at 369.
20051
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The Clarence Thomas hearings were extraordinary. During the
first set of hearings Clarence Thomas swore under oath that as a
law student he had neither discussed Roe v. Wade nor expressed
any views of the decision.31 In the second set of hearings, Cla-
rence Thomas had to defend himself against the sexual harass-
ment charges brought by Professor Anita Hill.3 6 The daytime
televised hearings broke new ground in live television as to the
descriptions of alleged sexual harassment. 7 At the end, Thomas
was barely confirmed by a vote of 52-48."8 But ideological selec-
tion of judges was not confined to the Supreme Court.39
III. IDEOLOGY AND JUDICIAL SELECTION
In the presidential papers of Ronald Reagan and his immediate
successor George H.W. Bush can be found numerous examples of
how both administrations sought out the most ideologically com-
patible judicial candidates for nomination. This was not, however,
the first time that a presidential administration warmed to the
idea of naming ideological soul-mates to the courts.40 There are
numerous examples throughout American history. For example,
there is evidence that President Franklin D. Roosevelt, particu-
larly during his second term, aimed to appoint supporters of the
New Deal to the United States courts of appeals.4' This was espe-
cially important at that time because the federal courts were gen-
erally hostile to the President's programs.42
35. See MICHAEL COMISKEY, SEEKING JUSTICES: THE JUDGING OF SUPREME COURT
NOMINEES 111-12 (2004); JANE MAYER & JILL ABRAMSON, STRANGE JUSTICE: THE SELLING
OF CLARENCE THOMAS 219 (1994); TIMOTHY M. PHELPS & HELEN WINTERNITZ, CAPITOL
GAMES: THE INSIDE STORY OF CLARENCE THOMAS, ANITA HILL, AND A SUPREME COURT
NOMINATION 192-93 (1992); PAUL SIMON, ADVICE AND CONSENT: CLARENCE THOMAS,
ROBERT BORK AND THE INTRIGUING HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT's NOMINATION
BATTLES 88-91 (1992).
36. Goldman, supra note 33, at 283.
37. See MAYER & ABRAMSON, supra note 35, at 290-91.
38. Goldman, supra note 33, at 283.
39. See, e.g, ROWLAND & CARP, supra note 13, at 51-53.
40. See, e.g., Sheldon Goldman, Judicial Appointments and the Presidential Agenda,
in THE PRESIDENCY IN AMERICAN POLITICS 19-47 (Paul Brace, Christine B. Harrington &
Gary King eds., 1989).
41. See SHELDON GOLDMAN, PICKING FEDERAL JUDGES: LOWER COURT SELECTION
FROM ROOSEVELT THROUGH REAGAN 26-38 (1997).
42. Id. at 30-3 1.
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But it was in the Administration of Richard Nixon that the
idea was put forward to search and screen for candidates who
would agree with the Administration across the broad spectrum
of issues.43 The idea to use federal judicial selection as an arm of
public policymaking came from a young White House aide, Tom
Charles Huston, who just two months into the Nixon presidency
wrote a detailed memo to the President that read in part:
Through his judicial appointments, a President has the opportu-
nity to influence the course of national affairs for a quarter of a cen-
tury after he leaves office.... In approaching the bench, it is neces-
sary to remember that the decision as to who will make the decisions
affects what decisions will be made .... [Tihe President [should] es-
tablish precise guidelines as to the type of man he wishes to ap-
point-his professional competence, his political disposition, his un-
derstanding of the judicial function-and establish a White House
review procedure to assure that each prospective nominee recom-
mended by the Attorney General meets the guidelines.44
Huston concluded by observing that if the President "estab-
lishes his criteria and establishes his machinery for insuring that
the criteria are met, the appointments he makes will be his, in
fact, as in theory."45
Nixon not only read the memo carefully, but he directed it to
Deputy Attorney General Kleindienst with a handwritten nota-
tion: "RN agrees-Have this analysis in mind in making judicial
nominations."46
But there was no follow-through. There was no bureaucratic
apparatus established to ideologically screen candidates for
judgeships-that was to await the presidency of Ronald Reagan.47
43. Id. at 205-06.
44. Memorandum from Tom Charles Huston, White House Aide, to Richard M. Nixon,
President, United States 2 (Mar. 25, 1969) (on file with the Nixon Presidential Materials
Project of the National Archives & Records Administration, College Park, Maryland); see
also GOLDMAN, supra note 41, at 206.
45. Memorandum from Tom Charles Huston, White House Aide, to Richard M. Nixon,
President, United States 7 (Mar. 25, 1969) (on file with the Nixon Presidential Materials
Project of the National Archives & Records Administration, College Park, Maryland); see
also GOLDMAN, supra note 41, at 206.
46. Memorandum from John D. Ehrlichman, Assistant to the President for Domestic
Affairs, to the Staff Secretary (Mar. 27, 1969) (on file with the Nixon Presidential Materi-
als Project of the National Archives & Records Administration, College Park, Maryland);
see also GOLDMAN, supra note 41, at 206.
47. GOLDMAN, supra note 41, at 291-93.
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To be sure, most appointees of Richard Nixon were conservative
Republicans"--but a few relatively liberal individuals were ap-
pointed because they were sponsored by the small group of mod-
erate to liberal Republican senators then in the Senate.49
At the outset of the presidency of Ronald Reagan, an institu-
tional apparatus was created to ensure that Reagan judicial
nominees were compatible with the philosophical and policy ori-
entation of the President."° That institutional apparatus was the
new joint White House-Justice Department Judicial Selection
Committee.51 That committee included key White House staff
persons as well as the Attorney General, Deputy Attorney Gen-
eral, and the Assistant Attorney General heading the new office
created by the Reagan Administration to oversee judicial selec-
tion. 2 That office was appropriately called the Office of Legal Pol-
icy.53
The joint committee was chaired by the White House Counsel,
whose office had become involved in judicial selection during the
previous Carter Administration.54 By designating the White
House Counsel as chair of the Judicial Selection Committee, the
Reagan Administration signaled that there would be a more sys-
tematic involvement of the White House in judicial selection.55
The new Office of Legal Policy and an expanded White House
Counsel's office undertook the task of ideologically vetting candi-
dates for judicial office.56 The Judicial Selection Committee then
coordinated the selection process and made the final decisions as
to whom to recommend to the President. At the same time, ad-
vocacy groups actively sought to influence the selection process so
that even a candidate that seemed to have survived the vetting
48. See generally id. at 198-235 (analyzing the use of ideology during the Nixon presi-
dency and the ensuing nomination of primarily conservative Republicans to the courts).
49. For example, the Ninth Circuit decision in Newdow v. U.S. Congress, 328 F.3d 466
(9th Cir. 2003), ruling the phrase "under God" in the Pledge of Allegiance to be in violation
of the Constitution, was authored by a Republican Nixon appointee, Alfred T. Goodwin.
50. GOLDMAN, supra note 41, at 291-92.
51. Id. at 292.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 291.
54. Id. at 283, 292.
55. Id. at 293.
56. Id. at 292.
57. Id. at 293.
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process could be sabotaged in the end.58 A good example of this
from the Reagan Administration concerned Judith Whittaker.59
Judith Whittaker was an associate general counsel of Hallmark
Cards in Kansas City.6" She came from a prominent Republican
family including her father-in-law, Charles E. Whittaker, who
had been an Associate Justice on the Supreme Court of the
United States.6' She was one of five persons from Missouri rec-
ommended to the Administration by then Republican Senator
John Danforth in the spring of 1981 for a seat on the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.62
At first, Whittaker's prospective nomination seemed to be on
track. Jonathan Rose, head of the Office of Legal Policy, recom-
mended that she be named to the Eighth Circuit seat.63 In a
memo for the Judicial Selection Committee, dated July 14, 1981,
he noted: "I have personally interviewed her and found her to
possess common sense, be aware of women's issues but not radi-
cal, and feel she is one of the best qualified women available for
our consideration.... She is a Republican."64
Reagan's Judicial Selection Committee discussed Whittaker at
its July 23 meeting and decided that more work had to be done
before going ahead with the nomination. 65 Behind the scenes at
the White House, opposition mounted against Whittaker and dur-
ing its July 30 meeting the Committee decided to drop her as a
candidate .66
Supporters of Whittaker then mounted an intense campaign on
her behalf.67 Her candidacy was embraced by prominent Republi-
can women.6" For example, in a letter to President Reagan, Re-
58. See, e.g., id. at 295-96 (describing how advocacy groups such as the NAACP can
influence nominations).
59. Id. at 330-34.
60. Id. at 330-31.
61. Id. at 331.
62. Id. at 330-31.
63. Id. at 331.
64. Id. (quoting Memorandum from Jonathan Rose, Office of Legal Policy, to Edward
C. Schmults and William Smith, Judicial Selection Committee (July 14, 1981) (on file with
the Ronald Reagan Library, Simi Valley, California)).
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
20051
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publican congresswoman Claudine Schneider from Rhode Island
pointed out that Whittaker had graduated first in her class at the
University of Missouri Law School and was a distinguished mem-
ber of the legal profession.6 9 "Further," wrote Schneider, "she pos-
sesses a strong background as a Republican... [and] has long
engaged in Party activities in Kansas City."7 °
The Committee then reconsidered Whittaker but there was
hesitation within the Administration, with opponents of
Whittaker calling into question her Republican credentials.71 On
August 18, Rose wrote a strongly supportive memo in which he
pointed out Whittaker's strong Republican credentials and strong
Republican home state support.72
Finally, at its September 3, 1981 meeting, the Committee de-
cided to go ahead with Whittaker.7 3 The Committee authorized
FBI and ABA investigations, with the presumption that
Whittaker would be nominated in the absence of unexpected
negative and disqualifying results. 74 To answer the charge that
she was not really a Republican, the Committee agreed that an
aide would check on her voter registration and report back to the
Justice Department.75 As one informed individual later put it,
"they [the FBI and ABA] found Mrs. Whittaker to have exem-
plary qualifications. 76 Indeed, the ABA reported Whittaker to be
"well qualified."77 The nomination papers were prepared and sent
to the White House in early November, and Whittaker was told
by the Justice Department that her appointment would be an-
69. Id.
70. Id. (quoting Letter from Claudine Schneider, Rhode Island Representative, United
States Congress, to Ronald Reagan, President, United States (Aug. 6, 1981) (on file with
the Ronald Reagan Library, Simi Valley, California)).
71. Id.
72. Id. (citing Memorandum from Jonathan Rose, Office of Legal Policy, to Edward C.
Schmults and William Smith, Judicial Selection Committee (Aug. 18, 1981) (on file with
the Ronald Reagan Library, Simi Valley, California)).
73. See id.
74. See id.
75. Id. (citing Notes of Fred R. Fielding from a meeting of President Reagan's Judicial
Selection Committee (Sept. 3, 1981) (on file with the Ronald Reagan Library, Simi Valley,
California)).
76. Id. at 331-32 (quoting Letter from Donald P. Lay, Chief Judge, United States
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, to Edward Zorinsky, Nebraska Senator, United
States Senate (Dec. 29, 1981) (on file with the Ronald Reagan Library, Simi Valley, Cali-
fornia)).
77. Id. at 332.
[Vol. 39:871
JUDICIAL CONFIRMATION WARS
nounced in a matter of days. But Whittaker was never nomi-
nated.79
What had happened was that as the FBI and ABA were con-
ducting their investigations, extremely conservative Republicans
within and outside of Missouri mounted an intense campaign to
keep Whittaker from being nominated.8 ° Richard Viguerie, a
right-wing activist, attacked Whittaker in his newsletter, New
Right, as a pro-abortion "strong feminist.""1 Viguerie and others
sharing his views orchestrated a letter-writing campaign in oppo-
sition to Whittaker. 2 The nature and scope of the anti-Whittaker
campaign is illustrated by a letter that Terry Branstad, then
Lieutenant Governor of Iowa, wrote to the President on October
14, 1981.83 Branstad wrote:
It has just been called to my attention that there is a possibility of
you appointing Judith Whitaker [sic] .... I have been told that she
is a liberal democrat and a pro-abortionist. A number of my constitu-
ents are very concerned and upset about this possibility. I certainly
hope that Judith Whitaker [sic] will not be appointed to this position
as it would be a real blow to some of your most ardent and active
supporters here in the states covered by the Eighth Circuit.
8 4
Branstad's letter was brought to the attention of White House
Chief of Staff James A. Baker III."
In November, the Administration put the Whittaker nomina-
tion on hold.86 Within weeks, the prospective nomination was
dropped because, in the words of the Deputy Attorney General,
she lacked enough "broad-based support."87
Some other examples from the Reagan presidential papers
demonstrate the ideological vetting process. For instance, a
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. (quoting Woman OffList for Judgeship, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 24, 1981, at B8).
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. (quoting Letter from Terry Branstad, Lieutenant Governor, Iowa, to Ronald
Reagan, President, United States (Oct. 14, 1981) (on file with Ronald Reagan Library,
Simi Valley, California)).
85. Id. at 333.
86. Id.
87. Id. (quoting Woman OffList for Judgeship, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 24, 1981, at B8).
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memorandum sent by Reagan's White House Counsel Fred F.
Fielding to the members of the joint White House-Justice De-
partment Judicial Selection Committee provided an analysis and
recommendation for filling a vacancy on the district court bench
of Montana."8 The memo discussed three candidates for the nomi-
nation: Charles C. Lovell, Jack D. Shanstrom, and Sam E. Had-
don.89 Fielding saw Charles Lovell as a highly qualified lawyer
who "has always been an active member of the Republican
Party .... [h]is views on crime issues and social policy appear
consistent with those of this Administration."90
The second candidate, Jack Shanstrom, had entered public life
when he was elected county attorney running on the Republican
ticket.91 Shanstrom eventually went on the state bench but was
defeated for re-election.92 He subsequently was appointed the first
full-time United States Magistrate for the District of Montana.93
Fielding reported:
As a trial judge, Jack Shanstrom had a consistent reputation for be-
ing strong on law enforcement-he has upheld the death penalty,
lobbied actively for a "good faith" amendment to the exclusionary
rule, and was rated one of the state's toughest judges in sentencing
criminals. Though not regarded as a scholar, his service and experi-
ence on the bench are highly regarded by both the judiciary and the
bar throughout Montana.... Although all three leading candidates
are clearly conservative, [the Department of] Justice notes that
Judge Shanstrom's long track record on the bench makes him the
"safest" nomination in terms of the consistency of his judicial phi-
losophy with that of this Administration.
94
The third candidate, Sam Haddon, graduated first in his law
school class at the University of Montana and was "the most
scholarly and articulate of the judicial candidates considered
here... [He is] one of the smartest and finest trial lawyers in the
88. Goldman, supra note 1, at 698-700 (citing Memorandum from Fred F. Fielding,
White House Counsel, to Federal Judicial Selection Committee 1 (Dec. 1984) (on file with
the Ronald Reagan Library, Simi Valley, California) [hereinafter Dec. 1984 Fielding
Memo]).
89. Id. at 699-700 (citing Dec. 1984 Fielding Memo, supra note 88, at 1).
90. Id. at 699 (quoting Dec. 1984 Fielding Memo, supra note 88, at 1).
91. Id.
92. Id. (stating that Shanstrom was appointed to the bench by Montana's governor
and was defeated for re-election eighteen years later).
93. Id.
94. Id. (quoting Dec. 1984 Fielding Memo, supra note 88, at 1).
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state. Haddon has been active in supporting Republican candi-
dates, a very pro-law enforcement NRA member; and he is re-
garded by his colleagues as conservative."9"
The Reagan Justice Department recommended selecting Shan-
strom but the Judicial Selection Committee recommended Lovell
who had the strongest political backing.96 Lovell was nominated
and confirmed in 1985.9" Shanstrom was subsequently nominated
to fill another vacancy on the federal district bench by President
George H.W. Bush in early 1990 and was confirmed later that
year.9" President George W. Bush picked Haddon in 2001 to the
seat made vacant when Lovell took senior status.99 Haddon was
easily confirmed several months later.10 '
The Reagan Administration's rigorous vetting of judicial nomi-
nees is also apparent in another example, this one involving a po-
sition on the Tenth Circuit, which was to be filled by a citizen of
Colorado. 1' White House Counsel Fred Fielding reported that
Colorado Republican Senator Armstrong backed the elevation of
Federal District Judge John P. Moore. 0 2 Fielding further noted
that four members of the Colorado congressional delegation rec-
ommended elevating United States District Court Chief Judge
Sherman G. Finesilver. °3 As for Moore, Fielding wrote, "[the]
Justice [Department] states that a preliminary review of Judge
Moore's reported decisions indicate his judicial philosophy is
compatible with the President's." 14 This was not Fielding's take
on Judge Finesilver, first appointed to the district bench by Rich-
95. Id. (quoting Dec. 1984 Fielding Memo, supra note 88, at 1); see also Sam E. Had-
don biography, http://www.usdoj.gov/olp/haddonbio.htm (last visited Jan. 22, 2005).
96. Id. at 700.
97. 131 CONG. REC. S4090 (daily ed. Apr. 3, 1985); see also Goldman, supra note 1, at
700.
98. 136 CONG. REC. S6157 (daily ed. May 14, 1990) (statement of Sen. Baucus); see
also Goldman, supra note 1, at 700.
99. 147 CONG. REC. S5100 (daily ed. May 17, 2001); see also Goldman, supra note 1, at
700.
100. Haddon was confirmed by the United States Senate by a vote of 95-0, with five
senators absent for the vote. 147 CONG. REC. S7992 (daily ed. July 20, 2001).
101. Goldman, supra note 1, at 700-01.
102. Id. at 700 (citing Memorandum from Fred F. Fielding, White House Counsel, to
Federal Judicial Selection Committee 1 (Aug. 1984) (on file with the Ronald Reagan Li-
brary, Simi Valley, California) [hereinafter Aug. 1984 Fielding Memo]).
103. Id. (citing Aug. 1984 Fielding Memo, supra note 102, at 1).
104. Id. (quoting Aug. 1984 Fielding Memo, supra note 102, at 1).
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ard Nixon.° 5 The memo stated:
[The Department ofi Justice's review of Judge Finesilver's articles
and reported decisions showed that he is a "hardliner" on crime, but
that he is relatively moderate on civil rights issues ... Justice has
expressed particular concerns over Judge Finesilver's analysis of
constitutional rights in Foe v. Vanderhoof. In Foe, Judge Finesilver
declared unconstitutional a Colorado statute which required paren-
tal consent before an unmarried minor could obtain an abortion, and
stated that "the right to privacy as expounded in Roe and Doe to in-
clude a decision to terminate a pregnancy extends to minors." Addi-
tionally, the judge referred to parents in Foe as "third parties" who
should not have "exclusive control over the activities of minors in
this area." Based on an analysis of Judge Finesilver's writings, Jus-
tice has concluded that he is not a suitable candidate for the Tenth
Circuit. 106
Judge Finesilver's candidacy was thus aborted.0 7
When George H.W. Bush was elected president in 1988, his
Administration, early in his term, perhaps to demonstrate its in-
dependence from Ronald Reagan, renamed the Office of Legal
Policy.' Its new name was the Office of Policy Development.0 9
Furthermore, the Bush Administration moved judicial selection
to the Deputy Attorney General's office-where judicial selection
before Reagan had historically been undertaken in the Justice
Department."0 The Bush Administration, however, continued
with the joint White House-Justice Department Judicial Selection
Committee, and the White House Counsel's office continued as
the center for the ideological vetting of judicial candidates."'
An example from the Bush papers concerns Jose Cabranes who
was then a federal district court judge." 2 His record was evalu-
ated in terms of the possibility of elevating him to the United
105. Id. at 700-01 (citing Aug. 1984 Fielding Memo, supra note 102, at 1).
106. Id. (quoting Aug. 1984 Fielding Memo, supra note 102, at 1) (citations omitted).
107. Id. at 701. Senator Armstrong's candidate, Judge Moore, was appointed to the
Tenth Circuit.
108. Sheldon Goldman, The Bush Imprint on the Judiciary: Carrying on a Tradition,
74 JUDICATURE 294, 295 (1991).
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 295-98.
112. See Goldman, supra note 1, at 701-02 (citing Memorandum on Jose A. Cabranes
(on file with the George H.W. Bush Library, College Station, Texas) [hereinafter Cabranes
Memo]).
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States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit."' The memo con-
cerning Judge Cabranes acknowledged that his "judicial writings
are scholarly, reflecting a lucid style and careful attention to de-
tail. He is seldom reversed. ,,114 Nevertheless, the memo as-
serted, "In general... Judge Cabranes' academic writings and
judicial opinions mark him as a judicial activist with deeply held
views regarding the power of the courts to bring about social
change."" 5 The evidence offered by the memo for this sweeping
characterization was a speech Cabranes made during a 1982
symposium in which he defended the federal courts as a forum for
protecting individual rights, particularly when state courts do
not."6 In addition, the memo reflected, "Some of Judge Cabranes'
criminal law decisions reflect a greater solicitude for the rights of
criminal defendants than is found among conservative jurists." 7
Finally, the memo concluded that "in construing the Constitution,
Judge Cabranes is willing to look beyond the text and the intent
of its Framers.""' Jose Cabranes, it should come as no surprise,
was not promoted by the Bush Administration."9 However,
Bush's successor in office, President Bill Clinton, elevated Judge
Cabranes to the Second Circuit in 1994.120
Another example of ideological vetting by the Bush Admini-
stration, this time concerning a district court post, can be found
in a memo that evaluated Joseph A. DiClerico, Jr., who had been
serving as a New Hampshire Superior Court judge.'2 ' His judicial
decisions, according to the memo, "were generally conservative in
outcome and indicated little disposition to endorse far reaching
contentions by criminal defendants or civil plaintiffs.... Di-
Clerico's civil decisions also reflected a generally restrictive and
cautious interpretation of statutory and constitutional claims."'22
113. Id. at 701.
114. Id. (quoting Cabranes Memo, supra note 112).
115. Id. (quoting Cabranes Memo, supra note 112).
116. Id.
117. Id. at 701-02 (quoting Cabranes Memo, supra note 112).
118. Id. at 702 (quoting Cabranes Memo, supra note 112).
119. Id.
120. 140 CONG. REC. 20,458 (1994); see also Goldman, supra note 1, at 702.
121. Memorandum from Barbara S. Drake to Lee Liberman (Jan. 9, 1992) (on file with
the George H.W. Bush Library, College Station, Texas).
122. Id.
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DiClerico was nominated and confirmed in 1992.123
Candidates for judgeships touted their conservative credentials
to Bush Administration officials. For example, one candidate for a
Second Circuit judgeship wrote:
I am enclosing articles indicating my conservative philosophical
leanings. The highlighted passages in the enclosed articles demon-
strate: (a) support for the death penalty; (b) abolishment of the Pa-
role Board; (c) support for lower taxes; (d) opposition to Medicaid
funding for abortions; (e) opposition to abortion generally; (f) support
for nuclear power; (g) support for reducing the size of government.
1 24
Another example concerns a candidate for a district court
judgeship who was serving as a state judge and who wrote:
[Als a trial judge I upheld our then [pre-Roe v. Wade] existing abor-
tion statutes and sentenced Oregon's most notorious abortionist to
prison at age 74 at a time when she was dying of cancer. So far as I
can determine, I am the only trial judge in the history of Oregon to
have sentenced an abortionist to prison. That sentence was upheld
by the Oregon Supreme Court ....I2
While campaigning for the Republican Party's presidential
nomination, George W. Bush committed himself to naming judges
like Justices Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas.'26 As presi-
dent, he stated bluntly that he is looking to appoint "conserva-
tives" to the courts .127 His Administration followed through and
almost all of the over 225 nominees to the lower federal courts
during Bush's first term can fairly be characterized as conserva-
tives who share the President's judicial philosophy. 28 To an even
123. 138 CONG. REC. 23,441 (1992).
124. Letter from Richard M. Rosenbaum to William Crystal (June 4, 1991) (on file with
George H.W. Bush Library, College Station, Texas). Rosenbaum was not nominated.
125. Letter from Robert E. Jones to Lee Liberman (Oct. 6, 1989) (on file with the
George H.W. Bush Library, College Station, Texas). Jones was nominated the following
February and confirmed two months later. 136 CONG. REC. 1280 (1990) (announcing the
nomination of "Robert E. Jones, of Oregon, to be United States District Judge for the Dis-
trict of Oregon"); 136 CONG. REC. 5284 (1990) (announcing the confirmation of "Robert E.
Jones, of Oregon" to be District Judge for the District of Oregon).
126. Elisabeth Bumiller, Bush Vows to Seek Conservative Judges, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29,
2002, at A24 (noting that in November 1999, Bush "singled out Justices Antonin Scalia
and Clarence M. Thomas, the two most conservative members [of the Supreme Court of
the United States] as justices whom he held in high regard").
127. Id.
128. See generally Sheldon Goldman, Elliot Slotnick, Gerard Gryski, Gary Zuk & Sara
Schiavoni, W. Bush Remaking the Judiciary: Like Father Like Son?, 86 JUDICATURE 282,
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greater extent than during the Reagan and first Bush Admini-
strations, the White House Counsel's Office has taken responsi-
bility for screening and interviewing potential candidates to de-
termine their compatibility with the President's judicial
philosophy.
129
The judicial selection process is, of course, a political process
with many facets. The trend has been unmistakably to move
away from primarily patronage concerns of the past to concerns
about furthering the president's policy agenda through judicial
appointments.
These developments in judicial selection-the avowed and open
use of an ideological vetting process that would assure insofar as
possible the selection of philosophically compatible individuals to
the federal bench-has set the stage for judicial confirmation
wars.
IV. OBSTRUCTION AND DELAY IN THE CONFIRMATION PROCESS
We have seen that the trend in judicial selection has been to
move away from primarily patronage concerns to concerns about
furthering the president's policy agenda through judicial ap-
pointments. Since the 1980s, senators have increasingly openly
opposed judicial nominees on policy and judicial philosophical
grounds.1 30 Most of that opposition, when it has occurred, aside
from Supreme Court nominations, has centered around nominees
to the courts of appeals. 31 This was true during the last six years
of the Clinton presidency when some Republican senators op-
302-09 (2003) (analyzing President George W. Bush's judicial nominees).
129. Id. at 284-85.
130. See GOLDMAN, supra note 41, at 307-19 for examples during the presidency of
Ronald Reagan. For examples during the George H.W. Bush Administration, see Sheldon
Goldman, Bush's Judicial Legacy: The Final Imprint, 76 JUDICATURE 282, 291 (1993) and
Sheldon Goldman, The Bush Imprint on the Judiciary: Carrying on a Tradition, 74
JUDICATURE 294, 304-05 (1991). For examples during the Clinton Administration, see
Sheldon Goldman et al., Clinton's Judges: Summing up the Legacy, 84 JUDICATURE 228,
231-41 (2001); Sheldon Goldman & Elliot Slotnick, Clinton's Second Term Judiciary: Pick-
ing Judges Under Fire, 82 JUDICATURE 264, 267-73 (1999); Sheldon Goldman & Elliot
Slotnick, Clinton's First Term Judiciary: Many Bridges to Cross, 80 JUDICATURE 254, 273
(1997); Sheldon Goldman, Judicial Selection Under Clinton: A Midterm Examination, 78
JUDICATURE 276, 288-89 (1995). For examples during the George W. Bush Administra-
tion, see Goldman et al., supra note 128, at 293-303.
131. See Goldman et al., supra note 128, at 309.
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posed and either delayed or killed some nominations. 132 And it
has been true with Democratic senators during the presidency of
George W. Bush.' 3
3
For the courts of appeals during the last six years of the Clin-
ton presidency with a Democrat in the White House and Republi-
cans in control of the Senate:
0 8 nominees waited more than one year from their initial
nomination to confirmation;
0 another 23 nominees went unconfirmed, 20 of whom did
not even receive hearings; and
0 a total of 43 nominees were confirmed for a confirmation
rate of 65.2%.134
For the courts of appeals during the first four years of George
W. Bush's presidency, 135 with Democrats narrowly controlling the
Senate for the first two years, and Republicans narrowly control-
ling the Senate for the last two:
* 8 nominees waited more than one year from their initial
nomination to confirmation;
* another 17 nominees went unconfirmed, 2 of whom had no
hearings; and
0 34 nominees were confirmed for a confirmation rate of
66.7%.
For the district courts during the last six years of the Clinton
presidency:
0 14 nominees waited over one year from nomination to con-
firmation;
o 40 never made it through confirmation, 34 of whom had no
hearings;
o a total of 198 were confirmed for a confirmation rate of83.2%. 136
132. See Sheldon Goldman et al., Clinton's Judges: Summing up the Legacy, 84
JUDICATURE 228, 252 (2001).
133. See Goldman et al., supra note 128, at 309.
134. See generally Sheldon Goldman, Assessing the Senate Judicial Confirmation Proc-
ess: The Index of Obstruction and Delay, 86 JUDICATURE 251, 251-52 (2003) (analyzing the
obstruction of President Bill Clinton's courts of appeals nominees).
135. These figures are for the 107th and 108th Congresses combined.
136. See generally Goldman, supra note 134, at 252 (analyzing the obstruction of Presi-
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For the district courts during the first four years of George W.
Bush's presidency:" 7
* 5 nominees waited over one year from nomination to con-
firmation;
* 9 remained unconfirmed, 7 of whom had no hearings;
* a total of 168 were confirmed for a confirmation rate of
94.9%.
In opposing the Bush nominees, Democratic senators have ar-
gued that they are concerned that President George W. Bush, like
his father and Ronald Reagan, is committed to packing the courts
with conservative activists.'38  These out-of-the-mainstream
judges, according to the critics, have an agenda that would negate
abortion rights, weaken the separation of church and state, un-
dermine the rights guaranteed in the Bill of Rights to those ac-
cused of crimes, unsympathetically view the rights of workers
and organized labor, weaken the laws and regulations meant to
protect the environment, and compromise gender and racial
equality.139
dent Bill Clinton's court of appeals nominees).
137. These figures are for the 107th and 108th Congresses combined.
138. See Goldman, supra note 128, at 309.
139. For example, at a nomination hearing on February 7, 2002, before the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary, Democratic Senator Diane Feinstein noted:
I think it is very hard to overstate the importance of an appointment to the
United States Courts of Appeals.... Many of the issues that we wrestle with
as a nation.., a woman's right to choose, civil rights, the relationship be-
tween church and state ... are essentially decided by the courts.
United States Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Judicial Nominations, Transcript of
Proceedings, February 7, 2002, at 2 (on file at the Senate Judiciary Committee Library).
At the Committee on the Judiciary's March 14, 2002, Committee Business Meeting,
which debated and voted on the Pickering nomination, Democratic Senator Charles
Schumer stated: "The Administration is... sending up waves of Scalias and Thomases.
Our courts are in danger of slipping out of balance. We are seeing conservative judicial
activism erode Congress's power to enact laws that protect the environment, women's
rights, workers' rights, just to name a few." Committee Business Meeting, United States
Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Transcript of Proceedings, March 14, 2002, at 59-60
(on file with the Senate Judiciary Committee Library).
In the floor debate over another appeals court nominee, Senator Schumer argued that
the Bush nominees "are committed to an ideological agenda which turns the clock back to
maybe the 1930s, maybe the 1890s." He declared, "I am not going to vote to give the judge
a lifetime appointment [with] the power to invalidate the laws passed in this legislative,
duly elected body; laws that protect privacy, laws that protect working people, laws that
protect women, the environment [and] civil rights." 148 CONG. REC. S7563-64 (daily ed.
July 30, 2002) (statement of Sen. Schumer).
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Republicans in turn argue that it is not the job of judges to cre-
ate rights and to veer from the intent of the framers.140 They sug-
gest that liberal judicial activists overlook compelling competing
values such as states rights and federalism, the right of a fetus to
life, the guarantee of the free exercise of religion, the rights of vic-
tims of crimes, the rights of those who own property, and the
right to be treated fairly and not be discriminated against by eth-
nic and gender preference programs.'
Ideological warfare between liberal and conservative senators,
fueled by advocacy groups since the late 1980s, was especially se-
vere when there was divided government with the White House
controlled by one party and the Senate by the other.' Democrats
were particularly resentful at how President Clinton's nominees
were treated during the last six years of his presidency when Re-
publicans controlled the Senate.' Republicans, in turn, were re-
sentful when Democrats controlled the Senate during the 107th
Congress and were furious during the 108th Congress that, even
with Republican control of the Senate, the Democrats successfully
filibustered or otherwise held up sixteen appeals court nomina-
tions including Miguel Estrada (who subsequently withdrew his
candidacy), Charles Pickering (who was subsequently given a re-
cess appointment by President Bush on January 16, 2004),
Priscilla Owen, William Pryor (subsequently given a recess ap-
pointment on February 20, 2004), Janice R. Brown, Carolyn Kuhl,
and four nominees from Michigan to the Sixth Circuit.
44
The full ramifications of the obstruction and delay phenomena
as they have emerged over the past three decades are presented
in Tables 1 through 4. Table 1 for the district courts and Table 2
for the appeals courts show the number and percentage of nomi-
nees who received hearings, the average number of days from the
140. See, e.g., Sheldon Goldman, The Bush Imprint on the Judiciary: Carrying on a
Tradition, 74 JUDICATURE 294,306 (1991).
141. See, e.g., id.
142. See generally Goldman et al., supra note 128 (stating throughout that typically
divided governments exacerbate the tension of the judicial selection process).
143. Id. at 294.
144. In addition, William H. Steele was nominated to the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Eleventh Circuit on October 10, 2001. He was not confirmed by the 107th
Congress. At the start of the 108th Congress he was nominated to a district court position
on the southern district of Alabama and was confirmed a little more than two months
later.
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time the nomination was received to the date of the hearing, the
average number of days from the hearing to the date the nomina-
tion was reported, and the number and percentage of nominees
confirmed by the full Senate. The proportion of district court
nominees who received hearings was at a high point for the 95th
Congress when all nominees had hearings and for the 97th and
99th Congresses when 98% or higher of the nominees received
hearings.145 For the courts of appeals, during the 95th, 97th, and
99th Congresses all nominees received hearings. In those three
Congresses, the same party controlled the Senate and the White
House.'46 The low points for the district courts were the 102nd
and the 106th Congresses with about 70% of the nominees receiv-
ing hearings. 14 7 For the appeals courts the low point was about
47% during the 106th Congress.148 Both the 102nd and 106th
Congresses had different parties controlling the Senate and the
White House. 14
9
The proportion of nominees confirmed has fluctuated. 5 ' For the
district courts, the low points were the 102nd and 106th Con-
gresses at about 70%."' For the appeals courts the 95th, 97th,
and 99th Congresses had a high of a 100% confirmation rate
while the low point was for the 106th Congress at about 41%.152
In general, Congresses that included a presidential election
year (the even-numbered Congresses), with the exception of the
108th Congress, had a lower proportion of confirmations than
Congresses that did not.5 3 The same was true for Congresses
with divided government, with the exception of the 101st Con-
gress.5 4 The findings in Tables 1 and 2 hint that major obstruct
145. See infra, Appendix, Table 1, at 904.
146. See infra, Appendix, Table 2, at 905.
147. For a complete breakdown of party division in the United States Senate from 1789
to the present, see the United States Senate's website at http://www.senate.gov/pagelay
out/history/one-item-and-teasers/partydiv.htm (last visited Jan. 22, 2005).
148. See infra, Appendix, Table 2, at 905.
149. See infra, Appendix, Table 2, at 905.
150. In the 102nd Congress, a Republican, George H.W. Bush, was president and the
Democrats controlled Congress. See United States Senate, Party Division in the Senate,
1789-Present, http://www.senate.gov/pagelayout/history/one-item-and-teasers/party div.
htm (last visited Jan. 22, 2005). The inverse was true in the 106th Congress. See id.
151. See infra, Appendix, Table 1, at 904.
152. See infra, Appendix, Table 2, at 905.
153. See infra, Appendix, Tables 1 & 2, at 904-05.
154. The 101st Congress was controlled by the Democrats in the Senate by a margin of
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and delay tactics for judicial nominations started with the 100th
Congress,1 5 which was the only Congress during Reagan's presi-
dency with the Senate controlled by the Democrats.'56 Subsequent
Congresses on the whole show increases in the average number of
days from the time of nomination to hearing and from the date
the nomination was reported out of committee and sent to the
floor of the Senate, although there are some fluctuations. 57
Hints of the obstruct and delay phenomena are even more ap-
parent with the findings in Table 3 for the district courts and Ta-
ble 4 for the appeals courts. 5 " What once was a routine process
when a nomination was favorably reported out of committee and
sent to the floor of the Senate-with significant proportions of
nominees confirmed the same day reported or one day after-has
significantly changed.'59 The average number of days from the
date the nomination was reported to the date of confirmation
ranged from a low of 1.8 days for the 97th Congress, for district
court appointees, and for the same Congress 1.9 days, for appeals
court appointees, to 42.2 days for district court appointees from
the 108th Congress and 68.5 days for appeals court appointees for
the 106th.160 The proportion of district court nominees confirmed
the same day reported or one day after fluctuated sharply but
showed major decreases during the last three Congresses, reach-
ing low points of under four percent during the 105th and 107th,
and for the first time ever, none for the 108th Congress. 16 ' For the
55-45, with the Republican President George H.W. Bush in the White House. See United
States Senate, Party Division in the Senate, 1789-Present, http://www.senate.gov/pagelay
out/history/oneitem and teasers/partydiv.htm (last visited Jan. 22, 2005). Nevertheless,
Tables 1 and 2 show that the confirmation rate for the 101st Congress was one of the
highest of any Congress. See infra, Appendix, Tables 1 & 2, at 904-05.
155. See infra, Appendix, Tables 1 & 2, at 904-05.
156. See, e.g., United States Senate, Party Division in the Senate, 1789-Present, http://
www.senate.gov/pagelayout/history/oneitemandteasers/partydiv.htm (last visited Jan.
22, 2005) (showing that the Senate was controlled by the Republicans during the 97th,
98th, and 99th Congresses, while the Senate was controlled by the Democrats during the
100th Congress).
157. See infra, Appendix, Tables 1 & 2, at 904-05 (showing that the confirmation proc-
ess generally slowed after the 100th Congress, though the 101st and 103rd Congresses
demonstrated that the process was still capable of proceeding fairly quickly, relatively
speaking).
158. See infra, Appendix, Tables 3 & 4, at 906-07.
159. See infra, Appendix, Tables 3 & 4, at 906-07.
160. See infra, Appendix, Tables 3 & 4, at 906-07.
161. See infra, Appendix, Table 3, at 906.
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appeals courts, the high was about 78% in the 101st Congress, to
the single digits with the 104th through the 106th Congresses,
and down to zero for the 108th.162
The proportion of district court and appeals court nominees fa-
vorably reported who received confirmation floor votes was below
100 percent for five of the fourteen Congresses.163 The all-time low
is for the 108th Congress 6 4 and can be attributed to the Democ-
ratic filibuster of ten appeals court nominees. 65
The portrait given thus far suggests that the confirmation
process has deteriorated in recent years and that the return to
unified government in 2003 has not greatly improved the situa-
tion.'66 An objective summary statistic of obstruction and delay is
helpful in getting a better grasp of what actually has been occur-
ring. Toward that end, I have devised an objective summary indi-
cator, the Index of Obstruction and Delay 67 and present the find-
162. See infra, Appendix, Table 4, at 907.
163. See infra, Appendix, Tables 3 & 4, at 906-07.
164. See infra, Appendix, Table 4, at 907 (showing that during the 108th Congress only
58.1% of appeals court nominees who were reported favorably were actually confirmed).
165. See, e.g., Neil A. Lewis, Deal Ends Impasse over Judicial Nominees, N.Y. TIMES,
May 19, 2004, at A19. As this Article prepares to go to publication, the judicial nominees
who were or currently are being filibustered are Miguel Estrada, Richard Allen Griffin,
Judge Carolyn Kuhl, David W. McKeague, William G. Myers III, Justice Priscilla Owen,
Judge Charles W. Pickering, Sr., William H. Pryor, Jr., Janice Rogers Brown, and Henry
Saad. For a detailed list of the filibustered nominees, see http://www.independentjudici
ary.com/nominees/index.cfm?CategorylD=8 (last visited Jan. 22, 2005). Miguel Estrada
eventually withdrew his nomination on September 4, 2003 after several failed cloture
votes. See id. William H. Pryor, Jr. was given a recess appointment by President Bush to
the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit on November 6, 2003. See,
e.g., id. Likewise, Judge Charles W. Pickering, Sr. was given a recess appointment by
President George W. Bush to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit on
January 16, 2004. See, e.g., id.
166. For statistical studies of lower federal court confirmation delay, see generally Gar-
land W. Allison, Delay in Senate Confirmation of Federal Judicial Nominees, 80
JUDICATURE 8 (1996); Sarah A. Binder & Forrest Maltzman, Senatorial Delay in Confirm-
ing Federal Judges, 1947-1998, 46 AM. J. POL. SCI. 190 (2002); Sheldon Goldman, The Ju-
dicial Confirmation Crisis and the Clinton Presidency, 28 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 838
(1998); Roger E. Hartley & Lisa M. Holmes, The Increasing Senate Scrutiny of Lower Fed-
eral Court Nominees, 117 POL. Sci. Q. 259 (2002); Roger E. Hartley, Senate Delay of Minor-
ity Judicial Nominees: A Look at Race, Gender, and Experience, 84 JUDICATURE 191
(2001); Roger E. Hartley & Lisa M. Holmes, Increasing Senate Scrutiny of Lower Federal
Court Nominees, 80 JUDICATURE 274 (1997); Wendy L. Martinek, Mark Kemper & Steven
R. Van Winkle, To Advise and Consent: The Senate and Lower Federal Court Nominations,
1977-1998, 64 J. POL. 337 (2002); and David C. Nixon & David L. Goss, Confirmation De-
lay for Vacancies on the Circuit Courts of Appeals, 29 AM. POL. RES. 246 (2001).
167. See Goldman, supra note 134, at 255-57; Goldman, supra note 1, at 713-16.
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ings in Table 5 for the district and appeals courts from the 95th
Congress through the 108th Congress.168
Obstruction is defined as the practice of taking no action on a
nomination to confirm or reject.169 Delay is defined as taking more
than 180 days from nomination to confirmation. 17 The Index is
determined by the number of nominees who remained uncon-
firmed at the end of the Congress, added to the number for whom
the confirmation process took more than 180 days, which is then
divided by the total number of nominees for that Congress. 71
When the same party remained in control of the Senate in the
subsequent Congress, a re-nominated individual had the date of
the original nomination counted in the calculation of delay. Also,
nominations made after July 1 of the second session of each Con-
gress were not included in the calculations so as not to inflate the
Index artificially on account of end-of-second-session nominations
that realistically would not ordinarily be able to move through
the process under an approximately 180-day time frame. The In-
dex is calculated to four places to the right of the decimal point
and thus ranges from 0.0000, which indicates an absence of ob-
struction and delay, to 1.0000 which indicates the maximum
level.17
2
As suggested in Table 5, for the district courts there were low
levels of obstruction and delay until the 100th Congress, and that
was followed by a further increase in the 102nd Congress. 73 The
same was true for the appeals courts during the 100th and 102nd
Congresses, whose indexes were even higher than those for the
district courts. 74 As I stated in a previous article, "Since the Sen-
ate of these Congresses was controlled by the Democrats with a
Republican in the White House, the Republicans' charge that the
Democrats were responsible for initiating the obstruction and de-
lay phenomenon is supported by the objective evidence."'75 But
168. See infra, Appendix, Table 5, at 908.
169. See Sheldon Goldman, Assessing the Senate Judicial Confirmation Process: The
Index of Obstruction and Delay, 86 JUDICATURE 251, 255 (2003).
170. See id.
171. See id.; see also Goldman, supra note 1, at 713.
172. See Goldman, supra note 169, at 255-56.
173. See infra, Appendix, Table 5, at 908.
174. See infra, Appendix, Table 5, at 908.
175. See Goldman, supra note 169, at 256.
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with the situation reversed, with a Democrat in the White House
and the Republicans in control of the Senate, the evidence clearly
shows that the Republicans escalated obstruction and delay so
that it reached all-time records for the district and appeals
courts, including the then unprecedented index of 0.7931 for ap-
peals court nominees in the 106th Congress.17 6 It should be noted
that in every even-numbered Congress (with the exceptions of the
district courts for the 106th and the appeals courts for the 108th
Congresses), which always overlaps a presidential election year,
the Index was higher than for the previous non-presidential year
Congresses.'77
The Democrats assumed control of the Senate after the first
five months of the 107th Congress with a Republican in the White
House, and the Index for the appeals courts reached its highest
point for the period analyzed-0.8387.17' However, the Index for
the district courts dropped significantly from the 104th Congress
to the 106th Congress and was even lower than that for the
102nd Congress. 179 This appears to reflect a decision of the De-
mocrats to focus their attention on the appeals courts and to read-
ily expedite almost all of Bush's district court nominees. 80
With the Republicans once again in control of the Senate in
2003 and with a Republican still in the White House, we might
have expected sharp drops in the Index. For the 108th Congress,
the Index for the appeals court nominees did indeed fall-from
0.8387 to 0.6471-but the Index nevertheless was the highest
ever for unified government (at least from the 95th Congress to
the present). 8 1 This undoubtedly reflected the efforts by the De-
mocrats to use whatever means they had at their disposal, includ-
ing filibusters, to obstruct and delay the confirmation process of
nominees whom they found objectionable." 2 On the other hand,
the Index for district court nominees, although lower than that
for the appeals court nominees, was nevertheless 0.3258, also the
176. See infra, Appendix, Table 5, at 908.
177. See infra, Appendix, Table 5, at 908.
178. See infra, Appendix, Table 5, at 908.
179. See infra, Appendix, Table 5, at 908.
180. See Goldman, supra note 169, at 257.
181. See infra, Appendix, Table 5, at 908.
182. See Neil A. Lewis, Deal Ends Impasse over Judicial Nominees, N.Y. TIMES, May
19, 2004, at A19.
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highest ever for unified government (from the 95th Congress to
the present).'83 Part of the problem for the district court nominees
seems to have been related to the elimination of the American
Bar Association from the pre-nomination process, resulting in the
nomination of some unqualified or barely qualified (by ABA stan-
dards) nominees.8 4 Additionally contributing to the delay was
that the Democrats shut down the confirmation process for sev-
eral months in early 2004 in protest of President Bush's use of re-
cess appointments to place Pickering and Pryor on the bench.'85
Only when the White House gave assurances that it would not
name any other judge by way of a recess appointment did the
Democrats agree to stop their obstruction-but even then part of
the deal was to only vote on twenty-five nominees.8 6 The indexes
for the 108th Congress were relatively high.8 7 Previously it was
just divided government that had been associated with high in-
dexes. 18 8 It appears that obstruction and delay are becoming more
common under unified government and what once was a rela-
tively civilized and functional process has increasingly become an
unpleasant, prolonged, and perhaps dysfunctional process.'89
Should something be done to blunt the sharp edges of contem-
porary confirmation politics?
V. PROPOSALS FOR REFORM AND RESOLUTION OF THE CONFLICT
If the current state of obstruction and delay is a cause for con-
cern because of potentially deleterious effects on the judicial
branch of government, there are steps that can be taken to reform
the process. But before the confirmation wars can be resolved,
there first must be recognition by the Republicans of the legiti-
macy of the Democrats' complaint that Republican obstructionism
kept open vacancies that the Clinton Administration, by right,
183. See infra, Appendix, Table 5, at 908.
184. See Robert S. Greenberger, ABA Loses Major Role in Judge Screening, WALL ST.
J., Mar. 23, 2001, at B8.
185. See, e.g., Helen Dewar, President, Senate Reach Pact on Judicial Nominations;
Bush Vows He Won't Use Recess Appointments, WASH. POST, May 19, 2004, at A21; see also
Lewis, supra note 182, at A19.
186. See Dewar, supra note 185, at A21; see also Lewis, supra note 182, at A19.
187. See infra, Appendix, Table 5, at 908.
188. See infra, Appendix, Table 5, at 908.
189. See infra, Appendix, Table 5, at 908.
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should have filled.19° It is not enough to dismiss this grievance as
ancient history or simply payback for the Democrats' actions dur-
ing the 102nd Congress. As the Tables suggest, the Republicans
subsequently took obstructionism to new and sustained levels.
191
There must be recognition that this has poisoned the atmosphere
and that both sides need to clear the air and to lay old grievances
to rest.
Second, President Bush, in his second term, should be more
sensitive to the likely reactions of the Democrats. President Clin-
ton shied away from those perceived by Republicans to be liberal
activists.1 92 A re-elected President Bush should aim for more mod-
erate conservatives for all three court levels. This would surely
lessen much of the contentiousness.
Third, Senate Republicans and Democrats should agree to a
permanent change in the confirmation ground rules, either by
formal rule change or a Senate resolution, that no matter what
party controls the White House and the Senate, the Senate Judi-
ciary Committee will hold hearings on every nominee. No senator,
even from the nominee's state, should be able to prevent the
committee from holding a hearing on a nominee. Of course, the
Committee can vote not to recommend and even not to send the
nomination to the Senate floor.193 The wishes of home state sena-
tors can be respected by fellow senators at this stage if they so
desire, but the Senate Judiciary Committee should vote nominees
up or down.
190. See Goldman, supra note 1, at 716.
191. See infra, Appendix, Tables 1-5, at 904-08.
192. See generally ORRIN HATCH, SQUARE PEG: CONFESSIONS OF A CITIZEN SENATOR
179-80 (2002); Sheldon Goldman et al., Clinton's Judges: Summing up the Legacy, 84
JUDICATURE 228 (2001); Sheldon Goldman & Elliot Slotnick, Clinton's Second Term Judi-
ciary: Picking Judges Under Fire, 82 JUDICATURE 264 (1999); Sheldon Goldman & Elliot
Slotnick, Clinton's First Term Judiciary: Many Bridges to Cross, 80 JUDICATURE 254
(1997); Sheldon Goldman, Judicial Selection Under Clinton: A Midterm Examination, 78
JUDICATURE 276 (1995).
193. In an earlier article I stated:
Because the Senate works by the committee system, it is reasonable to argue
that a vote by the Committee not to send a nomination to the floor of the Sen-
ate fulfills the advise and consent requirement of the Constitution. But by not
holding hearings and votes in committee, or by delaying floor action when
nominations are sent to the floor, the Senate has been engaged in obstruct
and delay, not advise and consent.
Goldman, supra note 1, at 716; see also U.S. CONST. art II, § 2, cl. 2 ("[the president] shall
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Fourth, the Senate majority leader should schedule a vote in a
timely manner on all nominees sent to the floor by the Senate Ju-
diciary Committee. By allowing one or more senators to place se-
cret or perhaps not-so-secret holds on nominees, thus delaying
perhaps indefinitely a vote, the Senate majority leader under-
mines the confirmation process (as happened during President
Clinton's second term).194 The Senate should do its constitutional
duty and vote to confirm or reject the president's nominees. If a
sufficient number of senators choose to filibuster a nomination,
repeated failure to obtain cloture should be recognized as a mani-
festation of advise and consent.195 Although it can be argued that
this would turn confirmation from a simple majority to confirma-
tion by a supermajority-sixty votes needed to close off de-
bate"'9 6 -it should be recognized that the Constitution only re-
quires "advice and consent;" there is nothing explicitly requiring
a simple majority vote for judicial confirmation.197 Supporters of a
nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint... Judges
of the supreme Court and all other Officers of the United States.").
194. See generally Sheldon Goldman, The Judicial Confirmation Crisis and the Clinton
Presidency, 28 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 838 (1998) (discussing throughout the article how a
Senate majority leader can undermine the entire confirmation process).
195. See generally Catherine Fisk & Erwin Chemerinsky, The Filibuster, 49 STAN. L.
REV. 181, 239-45 (1997) (defending the constitutionally of judicial filibusters); Virginia A.
Seitz & Joseph R. Guerra, A Constitutional Defense of "Entrenched" Senate Rules Govern-
ing Debate, 20 J.L. & POL. 1 (2004) (defending the constitutionality of filibustering judicial
nominees); Laura T. Gorjanc, Comment, The Solution to the Filibuster Problem: Putting
the Advice Back in Advice and Consent, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1435 (2004) (describing
the unproductive result of judicial filibusters though also supporting their constitutional-
ity). But see John Cornyn, Our Broken Judicial Confirmation Process and the Need for
Filibuster Reform, 27 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLY 181 (2003) (challenging the constitutionally
of judicial filibusters). Rule XXII of the Standing Rules of the Senate provides that cloture
of a filibuster can only be obtained by "three-fifths of the Senators duly chosen and sworn."
SENATE COMM. ON RULES & ADMIN., STANDING RULES OF THE SENATE, S. DOc. NO. 106-15,
106th Cong., 2d Sess., R. XXII, at 15-16 (2000), available at http://rules.senate.gov/senate
rules/ rule22,htm (last visited Jan. 22, 2005).
196. STANDING RULES OF THE SENATE, supra note 195, R. XXII, at 15-16, available at'
http://rules.senate.gov/senater ules/rule22.htm (last visited Jan. 22, 2005). The fact that
the Senate rules require three-fifths of the Senate to end a filibuster-meaning the votes
of sixty senators-creates the obvious problem that a substantial minority of senators can
essentially turn the Senate's judicial confirmation majority requirement into a superma-
jority requiring sixty votes to confirm. See generally John 0. McGinnis & Michael B. Rap-
paport, The Constitutionality of Legislative Supermajority Requirements: A Defense, 105
YALE L.J. 483, 495-96 (1995) (defending the legislative supermajority requirements, such
as the filibuster); Jed Rubenfeld, Rights of Passage: Majority Rule in Congress, 46 DUKE
L.J. 73, 87-88 (1996) (analyzing the "three-fifths rule" that creates legislative supermajor-
ity requirements).
197. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 ("[the president] shall nominate, and by and with
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nominee who is truly controversial should have to be able to per-
suade sixty senators that he or she indeed has the judicial tem-
perament to administer justice fairly.
Fifth, if the Senate fails in its responsibilities by not holding
hearings, committee votes, or floor debate, due to the actions of
one or a few senators, the president should utilize his constitu-
tional power of making recess appointments.19 The power of in-
stalling judges onto the bench through recess appointment has
been used by presidents since the founding of the United
States.19 9 In fact, it was a common practice up to the Johnson
Administration. 00 Some 300 judges over the course of the nation
went on the bench first as recess appointees, including Chief Jus-
tice Earl Warren and Associate Justice William Brennan.20 ' Of
course, they received their appointments not because of a consti-
tutional impasse due to the intransigence of a minority of sena-
tors, but because it was necessary to have a full strength judici-
ary and the recess appointment method permitted this.20 2 There
were, however, some instances in the past when recess appoint-
ments were used or contemplated in such impasse situations. The
recess appointment of Thurgood Marshall to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (racism was the issue)
and a few of President Truman's recess appointments come to
mind.20 3 President George W. Bush's recess appointments of
the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint... Judges of the supreme Court and
all other Officers of the United States.").
198. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 3 ("The President shall have the Power to fill up all Va-
cancies that may happen during the Recess of the Senate, by granting Commissions which
shall expire at the End of their next Session.").
199. See, e.g., STUART BUCK ET AL., FEDERALIST SOCIETY, JUDICIAL RECESS
APPOINTMENTS: A SURVEY OF THE ARGUMENTS 1-4 (2004), http://www.fed-soc.orgpdflrec
app.pdf (last visited Jan. 22, 2005) (providing a brief history of judicial recess appoint-
ments, starting with President George Washington who made a total of nine judicial re-
cess appointments, and calculating that "[t]he first five Presidents made a total of twenty-
nine recess appointments of judges"); Maeva Marcus, Federal Judicial Selection: The First
Decade, 39 U. RICH. L. REV. 797, 807 (2005).
200. BUCK, supra note 199, at 2-4, 16-26. Though the Buck article was prepared prior
to President George W. Bush's two recent recess appointments, it shows that since the
Johnson Administration recess appointments have been rare. Id. at 17. In fact, only Presi-
dents Jimmy Carter and Bill Clinton used the power and they each made only one recess
appointment, respectively. Id.
201. Id. at 2.
202. Id. at 4-14; see also U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 3.
203. See GOLDMAN, supra note 41, at 65-108 (discussing President Harry Truman's
judicial selections). See generally BUCK, supra note 199, at 4-14 (providing a brief analysis
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Charles Pickering and William Pryor in the face of over forty
Democratic senators' opposition-evidenced by their support of
and participation in the filibusters against those nominations-
although constitutionally permissible, was unwise in that it
worsened the rift between Democrats and Republicans over the
confirmation process and brought about unnecessary delay of the
confirmation of non-controversial judges. 4
A contrarian perspective on contentiousness, obstruction, and
delay ought to be considered: Republicans and Democrats are en-
gaged in debating public policy and the role of the judiciary. Ro-
bust, even contentious, debate is what one expects from a vibrant
democracy. And it is well to keep in mind that, despite the ob-
struction and delay, when all was told and done, substantial
numbers of judicial nominees were indeed confirmed under Presi-
dents Reagan, H.W. Bush, Clinton, and W. Bush. 5 It is likely
that the use of judicial appointments to further a president's ideo-
logical policy agenda will continue to occur as long as the courts
are vehicles for the articulation of public policy. There is little in-
dication that federal judges, whether appointed by Democrats or
Republicans, are refraining from using their power to interpret
the federal Constitution. There is also little indication that advo-
cacy groups, now firmly entrenched with substantial ties to sena-
tors on both sides of the policy debate, will refrain from pursuing
their agendas. When we have a President and senators whose
policy agendas are in conflict with the courts', we can expect the
judicial appointment process to continue to be a contentious one
although there are steps that can be taken, as previously sug-
gested, that can make the process a smoother one.
of the constitutionality of judicial recess appointments); Richard L. Revesz, Thurgood
Marshall's Struggle, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 237 (1993) (discussing Justice Thurgood Marshall's
nomination to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit); Thomas A. Cur-
tis, Note, Recess Appointments to Article III Courts: The Use of Historical Practice in Con-
stitutional Interpretation, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1758 (1984) (providing a general discussion of
the use of judicial recess appointments).
204. See Goldman, supra note 1, at 716. See generally BUCK, supra note 199, at 4-14
(analyzing the use and constitutionality of recess appointments).
205. See infra, Appendix, Tables 1 & 2, at 904-05.
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APPENDIX
FEDERAL JUDICIAL SELECTION - DATA TABLES
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TABLE 1
DISTRICT COURT NOMINEES AT THE COMMITTEE STAGE
Congress Number and Average Average Number and
Percentage of Number of Number of Percentage of
Nominees Days from Days from Nominees
Who Received Time Nomi- Hearing to Confirmed by
Hearings nation Re- Date Nomi- Full Senate
ceived to nation Re-
Date of ported
Hearing
95th 49/49 25.9 13.4 48/49
(1977-78) 100% 97.9%
96th 161/168 57.7 21.0 154/168
(1979-80) 95.8% 91.7%
97th 68/69 20.8 11.1 68/69
(1981-82) 98.6% 98.6%
98th 69/75 18.0 10.5 61/75
(1983-84) 92.0% 81.3%
99th 98/100 37.9 26.1 95/100
(1985-86) 98.0% 95.0%
100th 74/78 94.1 28.3 66/78
(1987-88) 94.9% 84.6%
101st 48/50 59.9 14.8 48/50
(1989-90) 96.0% 96.0%
102nd 100/143 92.1 16.4 100/143
(1991-92) 69.9% 69.9%
103rd 109/118 58.5 13.3 107/118
(1993-94) 92.4% 90.7%
104th 70/85 85.5 13.2 62/85
(1995-96) 82.4% 72.9%
105th 85/94 164.7 18.6 79/94
(1997-98) 90.4% 84.0%
106th 60/83 103.9 19.7 57/83
(1999-00) 72.3% 68.7%
107th 83/98 96.3 16.5 83/98
(2001-02) 84.7% 84.7%
108th 87/94 82.8 25.9 85/94
(2003-04) 92.6% 90.4%
Note: The 100th, 101st, 102nd, 104th, 105th, 106th, and 107th Congresses were
in a divided government situation with one party controlling the Senate and the
other the presidency.
Note: Table includes nominations to lifetime appointments to the district courts.
Territorial district courts with set terms are excluded.
Source: Statistics derived from data reported in Committee on the Judiciary,
United States Senate, Legislative and Executive Calendars, or other committee
documents.
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TABLE 2
COURT OF APPEALS NOMINEES AT THE COMMITTEE STAGE
Congress Number and Average Average Number and
Percentage of Number of Number of Percentage of
Nominees Days from Days from Nominees
Who Received Time Nomi- Hearing to Confirmed by
Hearings nation Re- Date Nomi- Full Senate
ceived to nation Re-
Date of ported
Hearing
95th 12/12 21.2 8.9 12/12
(1977-78) 100% 100%
96th 47/48 47.7 25.2 44/48
(1979-80) 97.9% 91.7
97th 19/19 25.8 6.2 19/19
(1981-82) 100% 100%
98th 14/15 14.8 29.7 12/15
(1983-84) 93.3% 80.0%
99th 32/32 40.8 12.2 32/32
(1985-86) 100% 100%
100th 17/23 90.9 41.5 15/23
(1987-88) 73.9% 65.2%
101st 18/19 63.7 14.5 18/19
(1989-90) 94.7% 94.7%
102nd 21/30 80.8 19.6 19/30
(1991-92) 70.0% 63.3%
103rd 19/21 77.4 17.0 18/21
(1993-94) 90.5% 85.7%
104th 14/19 79.0 37.0 11/19
(1995-96) 73.7% 57.9%
105th 22/28 230.9 41.4 19/28
(1997-98) 78.6% 67.9%
106th 15/32 235.3 52.2 13/32
(1999-00) 46.9% 40.6%
107th 19/31 238.4 40.6 16/31
(2001-02) 54.8% 51.6%
108th 33/34 144.8 54.0 18/34
(2003-04) 97.1% 1 52.9%
Note: The 100th, 101st, 102nd, 104th, 1Uth, 1U6tl, and 1u/tn uongresses were
in a divided government situation with one party controlling the Senate and the
other the presidency.
Note: Table includes nominations to court of appeals of general jurisdiction. This
means that the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit is excluded.
Source: Statistics derived from data reported in Committee on the Judiciary,
United States Senate, Legislative and Executive Calendars, or other committee
documents.
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TABLE 3
DISTRICT COURT NOMINEES ON THE SENATE FLOOR
Congress Average Number Proportion of Percentage of
of Days from Date Nominees Re- Nominations Re-
Nomination Re- ported Who Were ported Favorably
ported to Date of Confirmed the That Were Con-
Confirmation Day Reported or firmed
One Day After
95th 2.7 52.1% 100%
(1977-78)
96th 4.6 40.0% 100%
(1979-80)
97th 1.8 61.8% 100%
(1981-82)
98th 7.8 32.8% 92.4%
(1983-84)
99th 8.1 41.7% 100%
(1985-86)
100th 9.8 17.9% 98.5%
(1987-88)
101st 6.2 64.6% 100%
(1989-90)
102nd 3.3 80.0% 100%
(1991-92)
103rd 4.6 31.8% 100%
(1993-94)
104th 34.8 11.3% 95.4%
(1995-96)
105th 38.3 3.7% 96.3%
(1997-98)
106th 25.6 12.3% 98.3%
(1999-00)
107th 24.8 3.6% 100%
(2001-02)
108th 42.2 0.0% 100%
(2003-04)
Note: The 100th, 101st, 102nd, 104th, 105th, 106th, and 107th Congresses were
in a divided government situation with one party controlling the Senate and the
other the presidency.
Note: Table includes nominations to lifetime appointments to the district courts.
Territorial district courts with set terms are excluded.
Source: Statistics derived from data reported in Committee on the Judiciary,
United States Senate, Legislative and Executive Calendars, or other committee
documents.
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TABLE 4
COURT OF APPEALS NOMINEES ON THE SENATE FLOOR
Congress Average Number Proportion of Percentage of
of Days from Date Nominees Re- Nominations Re-
Nomination Re- ported Who Were ported Favorably
ported to Date of Confirmed the That Were Con-
Confirmation Day Reported or firmed
One Day After
95th 3.2 25.0% 100%
(1977-78)
96th 5.2 34.1% 100%
(1979-80)
97th 1.9 52.6% 100%
(1981-82)
98th 21.3 13.3% 92.3%
(1983-84)
99th 13.3 40.6% 100%
(1985-86)
100th 21.5 33.3% 93.8%
(1987-88)
101st 2.5 77.8% 100%
(1989-90)
102nd 14.4 63.2% 100%
(1991-92)
103rd 6.7 38.9% 100%
(1993-94)
104th 33.5 8.3% 84.6%
(1995-96)
105th 40.7 5.3% 95.0%
(1997-98)
106th 68.5 7.7% 100%
(1999-00)
107th 26.4 20.0% 100%
(2001-02)
108th 44.2 0.0% 58.1%
(2003-04)
vote: The 1UUth, 1lst, 1U2nd, 104th, 105th, 106th, and 107th Congresses were
in a divided government situation with one party controlling the Senate and the
other the presidency.
Note: Table includes nominations to court of appeals of general jurisdiction. This
means that the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit is excluded.
Source: Statistics derived from data reported in Committee on the Judiciary,
United States Senate, Legislative and Executive Calendars, or other committee
documents.
2005]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
TABLE 5
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INDEX OF OBSTRUCTION AND DELAY IN THE SENATE PROCESSING OF
DISTRICT AND APPEALS COURT NOMINEES
Congress District Court Index Appeals Court Index
95th 0.0000 0.0000
(1977-78)
96th 0.0750 0.0682
(1979-80)
97th 0.0000 0.0000
(1981-82)
98th 0.0545 0.1429
(1983-84)
99th 0.1364 0.0690
(1985-86)
100th 0.2800 0.4762
(1987-88)
101st 0.0488 0.0625
(1989-90)
102nd 0.3465 0.5000
(1991-92)
103rd 0.0375 0.0625
(1993-94)
104th 0.3780 0.5263
(1995-96)
105th 0.5000 0.6932
(1997-98)
106th 0.4722 0.7931
(1999-00)
107th 0.2432 0.8387
(2001-02)
108th 0.3258 0.6471
(2003-04)
